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One of the major objectives of the Reagan Administra-
tion during its second term in office is a major assault on
federal support for the Medicare program as well as other
federally sponsored social welfare entitlement programs.
Medicare in particular will be singled out for severe budget-
ary limits; but the real public policy question may well be
whether the Administration can successfully convince Con-
gress to recast the program as something less than a statu-
tory entitlement.
The fact that Medicare and those other programs can
currently be described as federal entitlements-and the
meaning and implications of that term-derives from the
New Deal origins of virtually all social welfare programs.'
Prior to the 1930s, many state and some local communities
maintained welfare programs of various sorts: cash grants,
social or medical services, or residential institutions. But
such programs rarely provided for more than the totally
destitute and are probably best described as "public char-
ity"; benefits were made available only at the whim of
popular sentiment, not as an exercise of acknowledged
responsibility. Even for those fortunate enough to be eli-
gible, benefits were rarely adequate or, given the social
connotations associated with charity, desirable as other than
a last resort or intended to be so. Government might have
provided welfare, but it had no obligation to provide income,
medical care, or other life sustaining services to those in
need.
The "social welfare" programs that replaced "public
charity" under the Roosevelt Administration were cast quite
differently. Having successfully urged Congress to under-
take various federal programs to stimulate the economy,
Roosevelt essentially urged them to underwrite the impact of
his economic policies with a "social safety net," providing
support for those who would not be the beneficiaries of the
economic growth expected under his New Deal.
The result was Social Security, a federally administered
income program for retired former wage earners (later
spouses and dependents and, still later, disabled former
wage earners) funded through a payroll tax; unemployment
insurance, a federally sponsored, state-administered cash
benefits programs for the recently unemployed, originally
funded by a payroll tax (later supplemented with federal
general revenues); and various welfare programs for certain
categories of the poor, also state-administered programs
with matching federal funds. It was to this "social safety
net," and to this political vision of such programs, that
Medicare and Medicaid were affixed in 1965. Medicare
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extended medical benefits to aged Social Security recipients
(and later the disabled, and virtually everyone over age 65);
Medicaid to (most) welfare beneficiaries (and a few others).
As many critics have noted (and the current Administra-
tion has repeatedly ignored), this "safety net" could hardly
be described as a universal social insurance scheme. The
welfare programs in particular have always maintained a
"deserving poor only" tradition and the political distinction
between Social Security for the worker and welfare for the
poor has always been reflected in both the benefit structure
and the underlying financial mechanisms. Nor have these
programs been entirely a federal responsibility. Even after
Supplementary Security Income (SSI) essentially federal-
ized three of the four welfare programs in 1972 (aid to the
blind, the disabled, and the aged poor were combined into
the new program; only aid to families with dependent
children ((AFDC)) remained as a state-administered welfare
program), the states have retained considerable financial and
administrative responsibility for Medicaid, welfare, un-
employment, and related programs. But the social welfare
programs, particularly Social Security and Medicare,
emerged as federally sponsored "entitlements." The federal
government made an open-ended commitment to finance an
income program and a medical benefits program for those
eligible. The focus was on providing adequate benefits for
the poor, the disabled and the aged, not making a fixed fiscal
effort. In the political sense of the term "entitlement," these
benefits became part of the prevailing vision of the American
social contract, a principal responsibility of the government,
and one of the primary elements of national domestic policy.
For a brief period in the 1960s, some argued that the
social welfare entitlement programs should be further en-
hanced; perhaps even elevated to a constitutionally pro-
tected status, requiring courts to limit the discretion of the
state or federal legislatures to reduce or condition social
welfare or eligibility. The Warren Supreme Court ruled that
states could not impose durational residency requirements
as a condition for receiving AFDC.2 Nor could welfare be
reduced without carefully drawn procedural protections,
including pretermination hearings under some circum-
stances.3 As late as 1974, the US Supreme Court invalidated
a durational residency requirement for eligibility for locally
funded medical care.4 Some commentators argued that these
cases would eventually require that at least life sustaining
benefits be treated as constitutional rights.5
But the suggestion that social welfare entitlements
might be constitutionally protected died rather quickly,
particularly with the advent of the Burger Court. By the time
of the Medicaid abortions funding decisions,6 the Court's
posture was insistently clear: social welfare is a political not
a constitutional entitlement, existing at the discretion of the
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state and federal legislatures. Consequently, the courts' role
in shaping or defining them under constitutional mandate is
extremely proscribed. Conversely, the role of the legisla-
tures, particularly Congress, is paramount. The entitlement
nature of social welfare is essentially and exclusively politi-
cal.7
The politics of Medicare and Medicaid have been de-
monstrative of the vision of social welfare as political
entitlements. Even as the costs of these programs were
pulled continually upwards by the spiraling costs of medical
care through the 1970s (and to a lesser extent by growth in
the beneficiary population), and as Medicare and Medicaid
became primary foci of the social welfare debate, only rarely
was the underlying commitment to provide adequate medical
care benefits for the poor and the aged questioned; until
President Reagan's election, the notion that the federal
government had responsibility for maintaining these pro-
grams at an adequate level and that those in need were
entitled to that support were political givens.
More importantly from a legal perspective, these politi-
cal givens were written into the statutory structure of the
programs. Unlike virtually all other spending programs,
which are authorized for a limited period of years, with a
fixed spending level for each year set in the original authori-
zation legislation (effectively setting a maximum ceiling at or
below which annual appropriations can be made), Medicare,
Social Security, and other entitlement programs were cre-
ated with permanent statutory authorizations. Moreover,
rather than creating the authority to spend up to a fixed
ceiling, these statutes define the terms and conditions of
eligibility, and essentially require the extension of defined
benefits to anyone who qualifies under these statutory re-
quirements. Hence, in the technical legal sense, as well as
the political, anyone who meets the criteria of the statutory
authority is entitled to income, medical care, or whatever
benefits are defined in these statutes.
In its most technical sense, this statutory entitlement
structure does little more than reflect congressional intent.
Holding aside politics, any or all of these authorization
statutes could be capped, amended, or even repealed by
Congress at any time. And even without fixed levels of
authorized funding, Congress must still directly approve
annual appropriations for Medicaid, Medicare Part B (which
is 75 per cent funded by general revenues) and the welfare
programs, and does so indirectly for Medicare and Social
Security (and other retirement programs financed out of trust
funds) as part of the budget and reconciliation process. But
Congress has never attempted to limit entitlement spending
through the budget or appropriations process and, histori-
cally, Congress has never shown any real interest in defining
its political commitment to fund entitlement programs as a
fixed fiscal effort. Medicare and other entitlements have
always been described solely by their eligibility standards
and by the scope of their benefits. Their funding levels have
been extrapolations, not prospectively determined limits on
the programs. Even in years when the welfare or Medicaid
budgets have exceeded annual appropriations, Congress has
merely adopted, with little debate, supplemental appropria-
tions. With other domestic spending programs, the annual
appropriations, the periodic need to reauthorize the statute,
and occasional budget shortfalls have provided opportuni-
ties, sometimes eagerly seized, to limit or reduce spending.
When Ronald Reagan was elected in 1980, the new
President's initial posture toward maintaining the entitle-
ment nature of these programs was somewhat equivocable.
In his initial addresses to the nation and to the Congress
outlining "America's New Beginning" in January 1981,
Reagan grandly exempted the "social safety net" for the
"truly needy" from the massive budget cuts he urged
Congress to undertake. The fine print of his proposals,
however, was somewhat less charitable: Medicaid and
AFDC were not among his definition of the "safety net"
(apparently only federally administered entitlements were
part of his vision of the social welfare "net") and the
President's rhetoric allowed for a distinction between
"budget cuts" and "budget adjustments." Even exempted
programs were scheduled for "modest" adjustments (e.g.,
he proposed the elimination of minimum benefits for Social
Security, and various benefit reductions and administrative
changes in Medicare intended to achieve nearly $1 billion in
first year savings). But by the end of the 97th Congress, both
the rhetorical distinctions and the promised exemptions
were abandoned altogether. The Administration was eagerly
seeking major reductions in Medicare as well as all other
social welfare and domestic spending programs; and it was
continually pursuing what it called its New Federalism-a
shift of domestic program responsibility (along with the tax
burden for such programs) from the federal to the state and
local governments, and to the private sector. There were a
variety of attempts to achieve this for the entitlement pro-
grams: Medicaid caps, Medicare vouchers, the privatization
of Social Security and other retirement programs. The
details varied, but the common theme was consistent: re-
structure the federal commitment to social welfare and other
domestic spending to become only a fixed fiscal effort, the
level of which would be determined de facto by Reagan's
commitment to increased military spending and reduced
business and personal income tax, the key political priorities
of his Administration.
By 1984, the balance sheet for federal spending reflected
the success of Reagan and his New Federalism during his
first term. Domestic spending programs had been subject to
several waves of budget limits drastically reducing the
percentage of the federal budget for domestic spending,
including reductions of $4 billion in the Medicaid budget and
$15 billion in Medicare. But at the same time, both the 97th
and the 98th Congress resisted many of Reagan's proposals
to restructure the underlying federal role in domestic spend-
ing, particularly with regard to the entitlement programs.
Instead, social welfare budget reductions were achieved
largely through benefit reductions, eligibility restrictions,
and a variety of so-called administrative savings. Thus the
underlying structure of the Medicare program remained
unchanged. Significant reductions on program savings were
achieved largely by paring the covered services, increasing
the levels of beneficiary cost-sharing, and, most notably, by
the institution by the prospective reimbursement scheme for
hospital services.
There may be little short-term difference between, on
the one hand, restructuring entitlement programs to achieve
budget savings and, on the other, limiting eligibility, serv-
ices, or reimbursement for services-at least in the eyes of
affected individuals. The political and long-term differences,
however, are significant. In essence, so long as the commit-
ment of Congress is to maintain social welfare programs as
federal entitlements, then program reductions have to be
devised in such a way as to avoid undermining the objectives
of the program, or at least claim to do so. Congress must
purport to identify strategies, such as prospective reimburse-
ment, that encourage efficiency in service delivery, or those
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that induce cost consciousness by beneficiaries; and not
simply offer a fixed dollar commitment. Cost of living
adjustments must be defended as just that, and argued in
terms that estimate their impact on beneficiaries and not just
the federal balance sheet. Perhaps most importantly, the
entitlement structure forces Congress to make affirmative
choices if it chooses to extract budget savings, and not
simply allow them by inaction or stalemate. In only slightly
exaggerated terms, the trade offs between dollars saved and
human misery increased must be made openly and affirma-
tively. While such representations may be of small consola-
tion to those who were directly affected by the $15 billion
Medicare reductions, the resistance of Congress to Reagan's
broader strategy for reshaping the social welfare commit-
ment, even while conceding to his budget agenda, may be
one of the most notable contributions of the Congress to
national domestic policy in the 1980s.
Consolation may also diminish as the politics of the
second Reagan term are clarified. In particular, whether
Congress will continue to resist Reagan's efforts to dismantle
the social welfare entitlements is very much an open ques-
tion.
The dominant issue for the 99th Congress will be much
the same as it was for the last four years: stimulating and
maintaining a stable economy, and jockeying for position for
the next presidential election. To do so, President Reagan is
insistent that the basic supply side strategy of his Adminis-
tration be continued: no increase in taxes, limited non-
military spending, deregulation, encouraged but not directed
economic growth. Not surprisingly, his initial budget pro-
posal, described as a "down payment" on the $200 billion
federal deficit, included over $50 billion in domestic spend-
ing reductions, over 10 per cent of which would come from
health programs, including $4 billion in first year reductions
in Medicare spending. Congress' reaction to his budget, and
its faith in the future, were less clear. While some in
Congress were indicating that they would resist the proposed
cuts, others were calling for more than a down payment.
And while some legislators, including those within the Pres-
ident's own party, were indicating a willingness to raise
taxes or limit military spending, others, from both sides of
the political aisle, were talking of "across the board"
reductions, and "balanced budgets," and making other
rhetorical references that essentially suggest deeper cuts in
all spending, but domestic spending in particular.
It is hard to imagine further reductions in spending for
Medicare, Social Security, and other entitlement programs
substantial enough to have an impact on the federal deficit
without undermining the entitlement nature of the benefits
they represent. Four years of benefit paring and program
adjustment have exhausted the opportunities for "painless"
savings. Yet it is also hard to imagine that Congress,
whatever the political strategy that is pursued, can ignore
such big ticket items as Medicare. Indeed, Medicare appears
slated for particular attention. Not only has the program
continued to inflate at 12-15 per cent despite annual attempts
at cost containment, raising projections for total program
cost to as high as $90 billion by FY 1987, but shortfalls in
contributions to the Part A trust fund have led to a prediction
that unless re-financed the program could be bankrupt by the
early 1990s. Even liberal critics are estimating that as much
as $20 billion per year in new cuts (or increased revenues)
must be found in order to avoid a financial collapse, let alone
contribute to a reduction in the federal deficit.
Congress may manage to postpone the short-term crisis
in the Medicare trust fund for a few more years, and it may
continue through the next several sessions pretending that
further budget cuts can still be called in the name of
economy and efficiency. But unless the magic of the supply
side strategy is far more powerful than anyone outside of the
White House really believes, then the real question, soon to
be addressed, is whether Congress will be willing to provide
sufficient funding to assure the survival of social welfare
programs as federal entitlements or whether it will begin to
retreat, either directly or tacitly, from what has been re-
garded for nearly 50 years as a federal governmental respon-
sibility.
REFERENCES
1. For additional background on the Amercian welfare "patchwork" and its
historical development, see R. Stevens & R. Stevens: Welfare Medicine in
America (1974); F. Piven & R. Cloward: Poor People's Movements (1977).
For discussion of social welfare programs (with particular emphasis on,
health programs), see K. Davis & C. Schoen: Health and the War on
Poverty (1978). For a history of the development of the Medicaid program,
see K. Wing: The Impact ofReagan-Era Politics on the Federal Medicaid
Program, 33 Cath. U. L. Rev. (1984). For an historical overview of the
Medicare program as well as a discussion of current political options, see
Financing Medicare: Explorations in Controlling Costs and Raising Rev-
enues, 62 Milbank Mem. Fund Q. / Health and Society 143 (1984).
2. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471 (1970).
3. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); but see Matthews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 773 (1980).
4. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa Co., 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
5. See, e.g., Reich: The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964).
6. Beale v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977);
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
7. For a more detailed discussion of these constitutional arguments, see K.
Wing: The Law and the Public's Health (2d ed. 1985).
784 AJPH July 1985, Vol. 75, No. 7
